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Expanding Media Law and Policy Education:
Confronting Power, Defining Freedom,
Awakening Participation
Erik Ugland

Diederich College of Communication, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
The changes brought about by the Digital Age have not triggered significant increases in political participation or
meaningful reductions in longstanding social power asymmetries, which are now increasingly negotiated in
policy contexts that involve mass media (surveillance, big data, net neutrality). At the same time, new
technology and communication patterns have opened fissures in public opinion about the limits of free
expression while also creating new legal risks for citizen-communicators. This article suggests that universities
need to recalibrate their curricula to meet the exigencies of this moment, which should include an increased
emphasis on media law and policy courses and initiatives. The article outlines a rationale for action, and some
strategies, based on the need to: (1) expand citizens’ expressive agency by equipping them with the knowledge
to shield themselves from overt restraints and subtle forms of coercion; (2) deepen citizens’ civics knowledge,
enhance their political efficacy and enable their political participation; (3) facilitate citizens’ engagement in
reemerging debates about the meaning and scope of the First Amendment; and (4) spur citizen involvement in

confronting pressing constitutional and media policy issues whose resolution will ultimately shape the broader
balance of social power.

One of the early disappointments of the Digital Age is that, for all its marvels and conveniences, it has done little
to expand citizens’ political participation1 or to foment significant shifts in the broader balance of social power.
The democratizing effects of digital communication that many scholars and commentators had forecast2 have
either not materialized or have been too pocketed to have significantly disrupted embedded social hierarchies
or larger systems of political and economic control.3
There are many reasons for this, not least of which is that digital communication technology is readily and
effectively deployed by those already in power. More broadly, the ownership and control of new media
technology and platforms, as many scholars anticipated,4 has largely been seized by big-media incumbents
(Disney, Time Warner),5 new-media goliaths (Google, Facebook)6 and other corporations that have inordinate
influence over media content, distribution, and, crucially, the policymaking process.7
A related problem and a focus of this article is that too many citizens lack the key knowledge they need to
mount effective challenges to the institutions that control mass media and the political leaders who drive media
policy. Without understanding the mechanics of the court system and policymaking processes or the
complexities of key law and policy issues, citizens are less capable of meaningfully participating in the emerging
debates that are reshaping individual freedoms and social power dynamics: surveillance, big data, online
privacy, media access. In the absence of this knowledge, citizens lose political efficacy – the sense that “change
is possible, and that [they] can play a part in bringing [it] about”8 – reducing their likelihood of political
participation and ensuring that power will further redound to those who already have it.
These knowledge deficits present more acute risks to people’s individual expression. Most Americans now
habitually push content into the digital ecosystem9 but without understanding all the ways in which it can trigger
liability. Being able to discern these legal lines is important as a matter of self-preservation. It helps
communicators avoid legal risks while fortifying them against attempts by others to censor or punish their
speech, or to persuade them, through bogus information or contrived legal claims, that their speech is
unprotected. Knowledge of law has a shielding effect, but it is also affirmatively empowering. If people know
that their speech falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, they will be emboldened to act and will have an
expanded sense of what we might call expressive agency – the ability to make autonomous choices about
expression, unencumbered by law or other sources of coercion.10
Few Americans are broadly knowledgeable about the law and policy aspects of mass communication. Only 57%
of Americans can name freedom of speech as a right protected by the First Amendment, and just 10% can
identify freedom of the press.11 Presumably, most people know far less about things like “actual
malice,”12 “reasonable expectations of privacy”13 and “fair use.”14 Libel, privacy, copyright and similar subjects
are certainly not addressed in secondary schools and are largely absent from post-secondary curricula as well.
The only university students who typically take classes on free expression, media law or media policy are
students in journalism and mass communication programs. Even law students are likely to get only glancing
exposure through courses on torts and constitutional law.
These are not trivial deficiencies. Americans are in the midst of a volatile political period in which the meaning
and shape of American democracy is contested and in which there is an intensifying public embrace of
authoritarianism.15 Free expression issues are at the center of this, in part because of the statements and actions
of political leaders like Donald Trump, who regularly attacks the press16 and has threatened to scale back freespeech protections,17 and in part because of broader philosophical divisions among people about what

constitutes speech,18 who is entitled to claim First Amendment protections,19 and who should be able to deploy
and control media technology and platforms.20
This article suggests that there is an urgent need to increase the public’s knowledge of media law and policy,
including First Amendment theory and doctrine, and that these subjects should be integrated into college and
university curricula and pushed more deliberately into our communities and our political discourse. These
changes could expand students’ and citizens’ expressive agency and political efficacy by introducing them to
concepts and methods to protect their speech, and by preparing them to participate in critical public debates
about media policy, the boundaries of free expression, and, more broadly, the distribution of social power. With
that in mind, this article seeks to articulate a rationale for strengthening and expanding media law and policy
education. It also proposes some pedagogical, curricular and programmatic initiatives that universities and other
stakeholders could take to enlarge public knowledge on these subjects.21 These are presented at the end, not so
much as solutions but as feasible steps forward; the overall focus is on providing a foundation for action,
supported by relevant communication and political theory and research, and driven by the premise that it is now
possible to view media law and policy courses as natural components of a contemporary liberal education.22
The next section examines the contemporary context, looking at the disempowerment of citizens, particularly
younger ones, and their exclusion from democratic processes, and also at the relationship between people’s
knowledge of law and policy and their levels of political participation. The second section looks more specifically
at how this lack of knowledge and participation is playing out in the context of emerging media policy
controversies and their impact on democracy and social power. The third section looks at the importance of
these issues in the context of contemporary debates about the scope of the First Amendment. The fourth
section looks at the connection between people’s knowledge of media law and their own freedom of
expression. The final section outlines proposals for expanding citizens’ knowledge of media law and policy and
explaining how these subjects fit in modern university curricula.

Confronting Disengagement and Disempowerment
This is a volatile and potentially perilous time for democracy around the world, with more countries turning
away from the post-War American archetype of an economically liberal constitutional democracy and toward
more totalitarian systems.23 This is true to some extent even in the United States, which the Economist recently
downgraded from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy,”24 and which Freedom House now ranks as only
the twenty-eighth most democratic country in the world.25 Scholars have also documented the slow corrosion of
American democracy over the past two decades, pointing to things like voter suppression, civil rights restraints,
gerrymandering, lax campaign finance rules, corporate domination of policymaking and at the ways in which
these things have disenfranchised or disempowered citizens.26 Americans have never been less satisfied with
their government.27 They also are less likely to vote28 or to volunteer in their communities than in the
past.29 These problems are more pronounced with young people who are particularly put off by politics.30 Just
40% of 18-29 year-olds in the United States voted in 2012; 18% did so in the off-year elections in 2014.31 Only
7% say they could imagine someday running for office.32 Younger people are also less politically engaged than
older citizens,33 and they are the least avid news consumers.34
This civic detachment is not unique to younger people. Americans as a whole fall short of what one might expect
in a society premised on popular sovereignty and representative government.35 Targeting younger people,
however, would be the most efficient way to shift these patterns, in part because voting and non-voting –
political participation and inertia – are, as the research conclusively shows, self-perpetuating habits that begin to
harden early in life.36 It is essential to try to raise young people’s “starting level”37 of civic and political
participation, which is lower today than in previous periods.38

A number of foundations and educational organizations have highlighted America’s “civics recession”39 over the
past decade and have sought to address what they perceive as a crisis in education about government40 by
proposing steps to augment politics- and government-focused course work and activities.41 In 2012, citing some
of this work, the U.S. Department of Education issued its own report and call to action, emphasizing the need to
expand civic learning and democratic engagement at all education levels.42 Then Education Secretary Arne
Duncan described the urgent43 need to “revitalize and reimagine civic education” – an argument that is
supported by scholarly research on political engagement,44 by the parallel research on the public’s declining civic
knowledge,45 and by the fact that the causes of political inertia tend to compound and accelerate each other.46
Contemporary political research, in aggregate, paints a portrait of American democracy in retrograde.47 Many of
the democratic structures and customs that have historically kept partisan and capitalist impulses in check are
being dismantled or diluted,48 and the power of the average citizen is shrinking, in part because citizens are
withdrawing from traditional political and civic spheres and in part because they are getting elbowed out by
more powerful interests.49 As both a cause and consequence of this, Americans are losing some of their faith in
and commitment to democratic government.50
Reversing these trends requires a sustained response addressing both the cognitive and behavioral aspects of
the problem and targeting multiple domains, most critically higher education. Colleges and universities are
where we nurture and make manifest the ideals of the Enlightenment by encouraging open debate and inquiry
and by applying reason and science to complex problems. As the Supreme Court has noted, “The college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.”51 It is also where, as John Dewey
might note, we “educat[e] for democracy”52 by providing a crucible for new ideas and giving students an
opportunity to seriously examine, often for the first time, the intellectual and structural foundations of
American government through courses on history, philosophy, political science, law and journalism. In addition
to measurably improving students’ political knowledge, motivation and efficacy,53 these elements of highereducation curricula are central to what Dewey called the process of transmission whereby we convey to younger
citizens both the core values and the “habits of doing, thinking, and feeling” that sustain democratic society.54
Expanding students’ civic knowledge yields a number of positive outcomes, all of which increase their capacity
for active citizenship and their odds of becoming effective thought leaders in the future.55 The opposite is also
true. As the Crisis in Civic Education report notes, the public’s lack of knowledge about government is not merely
a deficit but “a dangerous sign of civic disempowerment.”56 It is an indicator of a citizenry that is not fully
prepared for self-governance.57 Expanding media law and policy courses and initiatives would help address these
issues giving students another opportunity to study democratic government in a context that is both personally
and socially salient.
Students who take semester-long, stand-alone courses on media law58 learn a bit about the operation of
American government, the legislative process, the application of the Constitution and its interpretation by the
courts, the enforcement function of the executive branch, the relationship between state and federal law, and
role of federal agencies, among other things. These are secondary foci, however, serving mostly as the scaffold
for the study of issues like libel, privacy, freedom of speech, copyright, access to information, advertising
regulation, and broadcast licensing. But the macro-level democratic-structure issues are illuminated through the
examination of micro-level communication law issues, and in a context that is relatable to students who are
already regular creators and consumers of media content. The focus on media law issues provides an accessible
entry point. For some students, these courses catalyze their political interests and involvement or serve as
pathways for more advanced study of subjects like political science and history. At a minimum, courses on
media law and policy help to demystify the law for students, which makes their participation more likely.

Media policy is not a major component of most media law courses, but it deserves more emphasis. Media policy
focuses more on legislation and administrative law than on constitutional law and case law. It is also more
attentive to social structures and processes and how power is exercised through them. It examines the
intersection of politics, law and economics, with an appreciation for media history and the ways in which
contemporary media phenomena are frequently enabled or set in motion by earlier policy decisions.59
This is particularly useful exposure, as the next section suggests, and warrants more attention in
communications curricula, including in media law courses themselves. Still, a standard media law course
typically provides enough exposure to policy issues (particularly the Federal Communications Commission and
Federal Trade Commission regulations) and practices to give students a foothold to be able to track policy issues
and potentially engage with those processes.

Rejuvenating Media Policy
This is an unusually fluid period in American history. The rapid technologizing of society has confounded
politicians who have struggled to adapt the law to meet the challenges of the moment, and it has forced judges
to reexamine longstanding court precedents whose underlying presuppositions have in some cases been
upended.60 In moments like this, the law is especially vulnerable to being misdirected, which is why it is essential
to get more citizens involved in the debates about media law and policy and about the scope of expressive
freedom. It is particularly important to facilitate the involvement of younger citizens who, as digital natives, are
especially knowledgeable and who by virtue of age have the most at stake.
Americans’ media and technological dependency is self-evident. We use digital tools and platforms to execute
nearly every kind of human action. Most people also recognize some of the ways in which this impacts our
democracy, economy and social interactions. Some of the deeper effects, however, like the mediatization61 of
other facets of society, are less conspicuous, as are the below-the-surface shifts in power that occur when, for
example, companies secretly capture and sell people’s private data, or when foreign saboteurs “weaponize
distrust”62 by seeding social media sites with bogus information.
Both at the surface and at the more tectonic levels of society, mass communication practices and technologies
are impacting power relationships, mostly by entrenching and enlarging the preexisting power imbalances
between citizens on the one hand and government and corporations on the other. Our current media law and
policy, including in some ways the prevailing libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment,63 have paved the
way for this accreting concentration of power. This should be concerning but not surprising. Since World War II –
and particularly since the rise of Reagan-Thatcher neoliberalism – media scholars have developed a rich body of
critical and political-economic research that illustrates the often anti-democratic ways in which media power is
exercised and the symbiotic but not always public-interested ways in which corporate media leaders collaborate
with lawmakers to achieve their goals.64
For decades, scholars have emphasized the axial role of mass media in the cultivation of a vibrant public sphere
and the vulnerability of media to state and corporate domination.65 They warned about the amorality of marketdriven media,66 about the hazards of an entirely advertising-dependent press,67 and about the status-quo
reinforcing effects of corporate media structures.68 And, yet, the American media system is still almost entirely
oriented around the twentieth century eyeballs-to-advertising model with all its attendant effects on content.
Scholars have also repeatedly warned about the consolidation of media ownership and how this would lead to
more sensational, extreme, partisan and superficial content,69 polluting public discourse and weakening
democracy.70 Yet the media “shopping spree”71 that began with passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
has continued unabated.72 Six media conglomerates now control nearly all of the mainstream media
outlets,73 and there is a resurgent deregulatory momentum74 in Washington that will likely result in further

consolidation.75 At the same time, public media are all but moribund,76 and newspapers and local news outlets
are dissolving,77 creating “news deserts” in many smaller communities.78 The increasingly partisan cable news
networks, meanwhile, largely command the national news agenda.79
Great journalistic work is being done, but the national political dialogue is dominated by media outlets that
traffic in sound bites and ad hominem. This strategy is now trickling down to the local level where local
broadcast stations, like those owned by Sinclair Broadcast Group, are applying the Fox News template to local
TV news.80 And there is no refuge on social media platforms, which are infected with fabrications and conspiracy
theories and whose algorithms – in the case of YouTube, for example – respond to user clicks by serving up evermore incendiary content.81 It is no coincidence then that Americans are intensely polarized82 and, not
incidentally, that the environment in Washington, as one retiring cabinet official recently put it, is intolerably
“toxic, chaotic, disrespectful and subversive.”83
Media scholars, since the dawn of the Digital Age, also have rejected the utopian claim that the Internet would
“set us free”84 and that cyberspace would be, in the words of John Perry Barlow, a “civilization of the mind”
where “all may enter without privilege or prejudice” and where governments would have “no
sovereignty.”85 Even “Father of the Internet” Vince Cerf assumed that the Internet would remain unbounded by
geography.86 But governments have indeed penetrated and bracketed cyberspace. State censorship of the
Internet and punishment of online speakers is common and increasing.87 Freedom House reported in 2017 that
worldwide Internet freedom had declined for the seventh consecutive year.88 Scholars like Jack Goldsmith and
Tim Wu anticipated this,89 and Wu also wrote in 2010 that in the absence of deliberate, public-interested policy
protections, the Internet would eventually be coopted by government and business like every other mass
medium that came before it.90
This is the reality in 2019. Although direct Internet censorship is not yet a problem in the United States, the
government has seized control of the medium in other ways, exploiting its capacity as perhaps “the greatest
spying machine the world has ever seen.”91 This pervasive state surveillance – which despite being exposed by
NSA leaker Edward Snowden92 remains substantially intact – no doubt chills communication by journalists,
government critics, whistleblowers and others, while also raising profound privacy questions.93
The commercial domination of the Internet is also hard to deny. Not only is most of the popular Internet content
produced by for-profit companies, media businesses (many of the same ones) also control the communications
backbone that provides the public’s access points. With the elimination of the net neutrality rules,94 the
commercial character of online media will only expand, as will the entanglements between content providers
and service providers. There is, of course, still an abundance of user-generated content online, but little of this is
distributed in pristine “cyberspaces” but on platforms where users must comply with the providers’ rules and
acquiesce to their algorithmic manipulations of content. Users typically pay another price, too, which is the
surrender of their private data.
All of these issues raise important policy questions and have implications for people’s individual and collective
power and require the considered and collective input of engaged citizens. But there is much to repair in the
lawmaking and policymaking processes as well. Citizens and citizen groups cannot match the lobbying clout of
the large media companies and media industry associations. They also often lack the expertise to navigate the
byzantine systems of agencies like the Federal Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission.
Those agencies, as many scholars have shown, generally favor the positions of “economic elites”95 and are also
susceptible to regulatory capture – the tendency of agencies, over time, to become increasingly solicitous of the
companies whose industries they oversee.96 Policy decisions tend to be made by an informal alliance among
lawmakers, bureaucrats and lobbyists – the so-called Iron Triangle – who serve each other’s interests. Citizen

groups, with less to offer, are left out. The bureaucratic processes themselves, which typically include built-in
mechanisms for some level of citizen involvement, are often circumscribed or subverted.97
These problems are especially pronounced at the FCC whose commissioners are notorious for their close
connections with industry.98 There is a long history of revolving-door staffing at the agency where people rotate
between communications companies (or the law firms representing them) to Capitol Hill to commission
positions.99 As Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, noted in 2007, “Practically
every living former [FCC] commissioner is also working for a law firm, or with some media and
telecommunications company.”100 That trend continues today.101 It would be hard to dismiss all of these
problems as merely cosmetic given the agency’s recent policy decisions, most notably on net neutrality. Despite
the fact that 83% of Americans supported net neutrality,102 including 75% of Republicans,103 the FCC repealed
the rules.104
These problems are significant and the policymaking systems are flawed, but all of it can be reoriented if citizens
are engaged and knowledgeable. Universities can play a role in spreading that knowledge and equipping the
next generation of leaders and policymakers to take these problems seriously, in part by refashioning their
curricula to put more emphasis on these subjects (outside of communication programs), and in part by creating
opportunities for students to share their knowledge and ideas on these subjects and setting a goal for them to
be thought leaders, even while still in college. It is hard to overestimate all that is at stake. Decisions about
government and corporate surveillance, the use of big data, the diversity and truthfulness of news sources, the
control of media platforms, the security of networks, the existence of public media, and the application of new
technologies (drones, sensors, ubiquitous recording devices, artificial intelligence) will determine to a great
extend how society will be ordered and power distributed in the remainder of the twenty-first century. These
are not peculiar and confined policy issues. They are quintessentially public issues. As Robert McChesney put it,
media policy is “everybody’s business.”105 Whatever deficiencies or imbalances exist cannot be fixed without
active participation from citizens, and those habits of action need to be cultivated when they are young.106 This
is what will give individuals agency, enabling them to be drivers of media policy and not merely its subjects.

Preserving and Redefining Free Expression
In addition to grappling with all the emerging media policy issues, Americans are going to have to re-engage the
debate about the meaning and scope of the First Amendment. This could be a turning-point moment for
freedom of expression in America; the state of the First Amendment could become a defining social-political
issue for the next generation. Whether it is a collateral effect of the public’s growing antipathy toward “the
media,” a reaction to the proliferation of partisan news, or a reflection of a more deep-seated skepticism about
free expression, people’s commitment to the First Amendment is thin. Nearly a quarter of Americans say the
First Amendment goes too far,107 and many seem amenable to direct suppression of certain types of content. In
one recent survey, the majority of respondents supported the notion that the government should be able to fine
news organizations whose reporting is biased or inaccurate, and as many approved as disapproved of the notion
that courts should have the power to shut down such organizations.108
Fake and false information is clearly one concern.109 Another, particularly among conservatives, is speech that
they view as unpatriotic or subversive (flag burning, for example),110 and a third, particularly among liberals, is
hate speech.111 Younger people in general are less willing to protect hateful speech or offensive speech under
the First Amendment than are other cohorts.112 A Knight Foundation poll of more than 3,000 college students
showed that they value free speech and diversity/inclusion more or less equally.113
According to First Amendment scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, this is an area where there is a
clear generational shift. Chemerinsky and Gillman write that students in their law school courses are deeply

sensitive to maintaining environments free of hostility and are skeptical about court precedents that affirm the
right to engage in offensive speech.114 They write:
For [them], the historic link between free speech and the protection of dissenters and vulnerable groups is
outside their direct experience, and too distant to affect their feelings about freedom of speech. As a result,
their initial instinct [is] to be more trusting of the government and other public institutions, including the
university, to regulate speech to protect students and prevent disruptions of the educational environment.115
One of the key benefits of expanding media law education would be to communicate some of this history to
younger citizens. Students are understandably hesitant about extending free-speech protection to racist
agitators or anti-gay provocateurs, and this might indeed be an area where First Amendment jurisprudence
should be recalibrated. But those decisions should not be made without understanding the ways in which the
law has been used throughout history to suppress the speech and diminish the power of others on the social
periphery – abolitionists, union workers, civil rights activists, pacifists, socialists, religious minorities and atheists
– in order to shield the majority from ideas it believed to be “false and fraught with evil consequence.”116 It is
hard for us to imagine any truths except those that we perceive in the moment. Our censorial urges, therefore,
need to be tempered by some consideration of future consequences and the long-term viability of the principle
upon which we are acting.117 Those things are not fully recognizable without some examination of the past.118
It should not be surprising that many young people, while still generally supportive of the principle of free
expression,119 are unmoved by some of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and disenchanted
with some the First Amendment’s real-world effects. Their lived experience is not in a world with a flourishing,
Miltonian/Holmesian marketplace of ideas where people discern the truth through the careful application of
science and reason.120 It’s a cacophonous world of toxic discourse, conspiracies, and “deep fakes,”121 and a
homophilous world where people choose their own facts. The First Amendment is not the cause of all of these
problems nor necessarily their solution, but it easy to see why some might view our First Amendment
jurisprudence as all Kant and no Mill122 – too wedded to absolutist principles and indifferent to the facts on the
ground. We have crossed the line, some might say, between righteous commitment and self-destructive
fanaticism.
The real problem, in the view of some, is not so much the way the law treats citizen-speakers but the way it
coddles the companies that supply media content and that control the key expressive platforms. First
Amendment jurisprudence has spawned the resurgent neoliberalism in America by treating corporations as
people, providing undue protection to commercial speech, and giving already dominant media enterprises a
constitutional license to both consolidate ownership and ward off regulations.123 This permissiveness is rooted in
what some say is the false assumption that the only threats to free expression that should concern us are those
imposed by the state.124
There is clearly much about America’s First Amendment tradition and doctrine that is worth preserving, but also
much that we should expect to be challenged. This is a time of reckoning and reassessment in which some of the
most foundational questions need to be asked again and in which we encounter new questions every day: Is
computer code speech? Are algorithms expressive? Are robots entitled to First Amendment protection? Is
surreptitious recording constitutionally protected activity? Are Internet service providers speakers? Is native
advertising commercial or editorial?125 By expanding media law and policy education, universities can bolster
people’s political efficacy and enable more of them to be part of these discussions while also helping to ensure
those discussions are both informed by history and attentive to contemporary realities.

Protecting the Expressive Agency of Individuals
Individuals have agency when they have both the capability and opportunity to exercise their free will in making
decisions and taking actions. Agency is essential to individual self-determination, which is the principle that
undergirds the Bill of Rights and the whole system of international human rights.126 Social structures like law can
both enable and obstruct agency, and if people lack knowledge of the law, they will lack the ability to maximize
their expressive opportunities and minimize impediments. Expressive agency is used here to connote the degree
to which individuals are free to make autonomous decisions about what to say or publish, taking account of
both the law and their knowledge about the law.127 Knowledge of communication law and the First Amendment
equips people to defend their speech from negative restraints like censorship or civil lawsuits. It also introduces
them to tools like open records laws that they can use to improve the quality and impact of their speech.
The assignment of criminal and civil liability in American law is premised on the maxim that ignorance of the law
excuses no one (ignorantia juris non excusat),128 so there is no sanctuary for communicators who break the law
even in areas like intellectual property that are unusually complicated or unsettled. This presents an
extraordinary amount of new legal risk for non-professional communicators, many of whom had little reason to
worry about these things a decade ago but who are now routinely capturing, producing and sharing content
with mass audiences. Most of these communicators also lack education in journalism and so they are not versed
in the ethical practices of the profession or its methods of verification, which tend to give traditional journalists
some practical cover.
Those who acquire knowledge about media law and the First Amendment are empowered in several ways – first
by being emboldened to speak at all. Expression is a constitutive act, essential to people’s identity and
humanness. It is how people assert themselves in the world and realize their power. It is also, at times, how they
build solidarity with others. Something essential is lost to individuals and to society when people are chilled into
silence. That can result from overt suppression but also from people’s mere apprehension of harm. Without
knowing the law people are far more likely to succumb to those apprehensions and to self-censor. Knowledge of
the law can dissolve those inhibitions and give people the assurance they need to act.
Knowledge of media law and the First Amendment can help people protect themselves against acts of
censorship or intimidation, which are often initiated by those who are not necessarily knowledgeable about
these subjects. A university administrator, for example, might try to cut the funding of a student newspaper in a
plainly unconstitutional effort to censor the publication.129 Or police officers might violate the rights of citizen
bystanders by confiscating their smart phones after being recorded while making an arrest.130 Both of these
actions would violate the rights of the speakers, but if these speakers were not familiar with the law, they might,
respectively, acquiesce to the funding cuts or defer to the authority of the police officers. So, not only would
they lack the knowledge to defend themselves, their cognizance of their own ignorance would lead them to
assume the other party, as the initiator of the action, held the stronger position. A lack of knowledge, then, can
create an artificial power differential even in situations where neither party is more informed than the other.
Of course, sometimes there is an actual power differential between the speaker and the person seeking to
suppress speech. When the knowledgeable party knows the speaker is less knowledgeable, there is a high risk of
abuse and manipulation. The most common example is where a powerful person, through his or her lawyer,
threatens a lawsuit or sends a cease and desist letter. Such a missive is rarely an actual step toward litigation but
are nevertheless chilling to a less knowledgeable speaker.
Large, corporate copyright owners are regular perpetrators of these kinds of exploitations. The major studios
and record labels relentlessly file takedown notices with YouTube and other social media sites to shut down uses
of their content.131 They often do this without considering whether the use is a fair use, because they recognize
that many less-knowledgeable users will simply comply in order to avoid the risk.132 When thousands or millions

of users do this it creates a culture of compliance. The copyright owners are therefore able wield their
knowledge in ways that change outcomes without changing the law.
Creating an apprehension of liability is a tactic that has worked for other copyright owners as well. One of the
most important elements of the fair use defense is the effect of the use on the market for the original
work.133 By using similar intimidation tactics and inducing users to be in the habit of paying to use copyrighted
works, the copyright owners are able to say in subsequent cases that any unauthorized uses necessarily impact
their market because normally people pay. By bullying current users into paying for the work, they help create a
“permissions culture”134 while also building a factual foundation to defeat fair use claims by future users.135
The most obvious way in which knowledge of media law and the First Amendment can empower people is by
allowing them to simply stay out of legal trouble. People using social media, for example, who do not know
anything about the law of libel or privacy, are likely to be either bounded by their ignorance – by self-censoring
in response to the uncertainty or buckling to the claims of would-be plaintiffs – or will forge ahead blindly,
putting themselves in legal jeopardy.
When people lack knowledge about the law, their tendency is to take cues from others and conform their
behavior to the practices of those around them. This can often provide some protection in the sense that people
are normally compliant with the law and so aligning one’s behavior with the customs of the majority usually
keeps one in proximity of legality. As Rudolf Leonhard wrote more than a century ago, “Human customs
everywhere fit themselves to the law. As a rule, whoever follows these customs may be sure of not offending
the law even if he ignores the statutes and the other local forms of law.”136 This is only half true, of course.
There are many customs and habits that have emerged in the Digital Age of mass communication that do not
align with the law (illegal file-sharing, for example). In the absence of actual legal knowledge, the new wave of
amateur communicators either mimic the practices of the community or rely on word-of-mouth legal advice.
The Digital Age has spawned a whole body of ersatz law based on hand-me-down urban myths: You can’t be
sued for a re-tweet; public officials can’t sue for libel; you can use up to four seconds of a copyrighted song
without permission; false speech, hate speech and commercial speech are not protected by the First Amendment.
People who rely on this crowd-sourced legal knowledge either put themselves in legal jeopardy or limit the
possibilities of their own expression.
Expanding people’s knowledge of media law and the First Amendment is about more than self-preservation and
avoiding liability for social media posts. It is essential for restoring some equilibrium in the distribution of power
across society by ensuring that citizen-communicators can serve as effective watchdogs of the people and
institutions with the greatest social influence. Despite the democratization of access to communication
technology, there are still extraordinary power disparities in society. People need to actively assert and fight for
their sovereignty or it will simply be taken. It is essential, then, that this new generation of citizencommunicators be able to effectively use the law to exercise their own power while also checking its exercise by
law enforcement officials, politicians, business leaders and others. People need to know when they can record in
public, what government records they can access, what spaces they can occupy, and what meetings they can
attend. All of this will enable their public-focused communication while expanding their expressive agency and
their resilience in the face of intimidation.137

Steps Forward: Expanding Education on Media Law and Policy
In 1970, renowned speech communication professor Franklyn Haiman was asked to explain to his colleagues
why he studied and wrote about free speech and, more specifically, why he thought it should be taught in
speech communication programs. He noted that for decades “press law” courses had been common in
journalism programs. He wrote, “Certainly the oral communicator, whether his medium be the public speech or

rally, radio or television, stage or screen, needs equally to know his rights and responsibilities.”138 Indeed, it is
worth asking half a century later why, in a time of ubiquitous communication, all citizens should not acquire at
least some of that same knowledge. Of course, what people need is more than a basic understanding of their
rights and responsibilities, as Haiman surely would agree. But even some rudimentary knowledge is enough to
help people activate their own expression and shield themselves from interference while also facilitating their
broader civic engagement.
This article assumes that the strength of a democracy can be gauged in part by the extent to which its citizens
participate through their votes, their political expression and their collective action.139 This participation does
not always occur naturally and is often actively discouraged or obstructed, at times by the government itself, so
it has to be taught and practiced. In addition to helping students acquire the knowledge they need to engage in
debates about media law and policy, faculty teaching these courses should create opportunities to cultivate
these habits of participation by getting students to apply their knowledge through direct action and to publicly
share their ideas.
There is no single act or initiative that could address all of the problems identified above, and some of these will
be more applicable to, or feasible for, some than others. They are not exotic and that is intentional. The goal
here is simply to identify some priorities and realistic next steps that align with established or emerging best
practices in pedagogy and that are attentive to some of the broader goals for twenty-first century higher
education identified by groups like the American Association of Colleges and Universities. AACU proposes that
institutions of higher education must help preserve a just society by developing a new generation of “intentional
learners” who actively participate as citizens in a diverse democracy.140 In pursuit of that goal it urges faculty to,
among other things, emphasize problem-based and team-based learning, create off-campus learning
experiences, develop service-learning programs and develop courses that force students to address current
social problems and propose solutions.141 Faculty teaching law and policy are well situated not only to impart
useful knowledge to students (including those outside of communication programs) that can help those
students preserve their expressive agency, but also to create opportunities that help students prepare for lives
of active citizenship.

Preserving Coursework Within Communication
Before embarking on any new curricular initiative, journalism and mass communication programs142 should first
preserve and build on what they already offer. Courses on media law have long been part of standard journalism
and mass communication curricula and remain part of the tradition. The very first core competency mentioned
in the standards of the Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communication emphasizes the
need for students to “understand and apply the principles and laws of freedom of speech and press …, receive
instruction in and understand the range of systems of freedom of expression around the world, including the
right to dissent, to monitor and criticize power, and to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.”143
That is a heavy load, and not a realistic educational goal for programs that do not have a stand-alone course in
media law that is required of students in the major. It is too much to expect these subjects to get adequate
coverage if they are only addressed incidentally in courses on reporting, editing, management, and similar
topics. It is also not possible for programs to satisfy the ACEJMC standard if they merge their media law course
with media ethics – something many programs do in order to create curricular efficiencies, often so they can
respond to the growing demand for skills and production courses. Other programs might simply combine law
and ethics because they view them as complementary subjects, which they are. The problem is that there is not
enough time in these combined courses to give both subjects the attention they deserve.144

A required media law course should be the minimum standard offering in all journalism and mass
communication programs. Departments with sufficient resources should also consider offering a separate,
elective course on media policy. Some programs already go much further, offering courses on the political
economy of mass media, or special seminars on Internet law, telecommunications policy, intellectual property
and other subjects. And some collaborate with programs in political science, law or business. Only a few
programs have the capacity to provide this much curricular depth, but a media law course requirement is
certainly a reasonable and feasible expectation.

Expanding Coursework Outside of Communication
America’s journalism and mass communication programs have for decades been the primary academic
institutions committed to teaching students about media law and the only academic bodies that have
consistently sought to educate undergraduate students about the history and meaning of the First Amendment.
Faculty in these programs have led generations of students in examining the role of free expression in society
and have prepared those students to understand and drive public debates about these issues. The students
taking these courses, however, have been almost exclusively undergraduate juniors and seniors in
communication programs. It is rare for students outside these programs to have significant exposure to these
issues in their undergraduate curricula, even though freedom of speech and press are core cultural and
constitutional values, and even though much of today’s human interaction and civic engagement occurs in
mediated or other online platforms. Nearly every citizen is now at least occasionally a public communicator, and
many citizens perform journalistic functions by gathering and sharing information of public significance. But
instead of treating media law and policy as foundational subjects for equipping people to securely and
meaningfully engage in public life, these classes have remained sequestered within communication
departments.
A simple first step would be to open media law and policy courses to non-majors, as some programs do. A better
approach would be to develop a new course specifically tailored to the general university population. This would
not be difficult. Even though it is sometimes helpful for students taking media law courses to have already
completed other courses in the communication curriculum, it is not essential. For most communication majors,
the media law course is their first significant exposure to the subject, so there is no reason to think that noncommunication majors would face any insurmountable problems.
A refashioned course for non-communication majors might address the subject from a slightly different vantage
point, with more emphasis on individual communicators than institutional ones. It could explore subjects like
newsgathering and access but with an emphasis on citizen journalism, and it might look at commercial speech
regulation more from the perspective of the consumer. It might also put more emphasis on some nonjournalistic contexts like public expression and protest; free speech in the workplace; social media policy and
platforms’ terms of use; and campaign finance law and the First Amendment.
The course could cover most of the same subjects as the standard course but with some small modifications. It
would certainly need to address the foundational topics that are relevant to all communicators, such as prior
restraint, libel and privacy, among others. It might be useful, however, to scrape away some of the more
technical details and to put more emphasis on history, theories and rationales so that students are better
prepared to critically evaluate the law and explore opportunities for reform.
Some of this winnowing could be done in each of the principal units of the course. In libel, for example, one
could eliminate some of the material on jurisdictional issues, types of damage awards, and some of the details of
the various defenses without major sacrifice. In the privacy area, the appropriation and right of publicity
material, while important, could be scaled back. In the newsgathering area, some of the reporter’s privilege and

free press-fair trial material might be less relevant to non-journalists. Much of the advertising and commercial
speech content could be compressed. And while it would still be important to address many of the FCC’s rules
for broadcast, cable and internet communicators, some of the more arcane ones could just be mentioned briefly
or bypassed.145 There are also some whole subject areas that could be wholly or nearly eliminated. Obscenity
law, for example, is fascinating but has largely fallen off the radar of courts and legislatures. The standard unit
on open records and meetings could also be abridged. It is crucial that these issues still be addressed, but it is
probably enough for most students to know about the existence of these laws and their general scope without
diving too deeply into the case-law interpretations. Making some of these changes would create space to
examine some of the other expressive contexts noted earlier and to more fully address key policy issues like net
neutrality, surveillance and big data, among other possibilities.146
None of this is to suggest that a course aimed at non-communication students should be less rigorous or
conceptual than a traditional course. Indeed, its tighter focus would ideally make it easier for faculty to build in
more theoretical and historical components. The ultimate goal would be for students to begin formulating and
articulating their own theories about the balance between freedom and restraint so that they can be intelligent
contributors to public debates about media law and policy. That is not possible without some practice in
deconstructing the law, scrutinizing the rationales that support it and examining the political and procedural
structures that shape it.

Externalizing Media Law and Policy: Practicums and Advocacy
One of the first things media law students discover is that the law is less the embodiment of timeless doctrines
than the product of an ongoing social and political negotiation. There are few fixed principles in American law
and little consensus among judges about the meaning of legal texts or about the interpretive methods judges
should apply to them. It is important that students recognize this dynamism, because they often have creative
ideas for reforming the law and they have the potential to be thought leaders on these subjects. Unfortunately,
their voices are largely absent from the public conversations about free expression and media policy.
Faculty teaching media law courses could help inform and energize those debates, as some do, by not only
encouraging their students to challenge the received wisdom about media law and policy, but also requiring
them to disseminate their ideas off campus. This can involve basic assignments like writing opinion pieces,
columns, blog posts, letters to the editor, or producing and posting videos or podcasts. More advanced students
could also work on drafting amicus briefs in active court cases, perhaps in collaboration with law students or
faculty. For media policy courses in particular, adding an advocacy component like this could be particularly
fruitful and those courses could serve as known and recurring sources of new ideas on media reform.
There are even more direct ways in which media law students could apply their knowledge beyond the
classroom. They could propose or lobby for legislation, submit public comments or speak in open forums.
Students might be more likely to do this if they are also among the parties affected. Several states have recently
passed or considered laws dealing with cyberbullying, online privacy, social media password protection, and
student free expression, and have given students the opportunity to offer live testimony to legislative
committees. Faculty cannot always count on opportunities like this arising, but by creating a themed seminar
that is regularly offered, they can adapt it to whatever issues are salient that semester.
Faculty might only find that one or two of these ideas for externalizing the class experience are realistic in a
given semester but implementing any of them would help advance the larger goal of graduating new cohorts of
students who are both knowledgeable for their own sake and also experienced and habituated contributors to
public debates.147 Any of these activities would be a step toward preparing students for what the American
Council on Education calls “engaged citizenship,”148 and what the Department of Education calls “democratic

engagement,”149 which requires “educational experiences that intentionally prepare students for informed,
engaged participation in civic and democratic life by providing opportunities to develop civic knowledge, skills,
and dispositions through learning and practice.”150 There are many ways that faculty can help students achieve
those ends, but the emphasis should be on external application because the research clearly demonstrates the
long-term educational benefits of those activities.151

Peer Education and Service Learning: Workshops and Forums
Another way to elevate public knowledge on media law and policy issues is through forums, workshops, lectures
or panels that are aimed at non-experts. Students and faculty can work together to conduct these sessions as a
way of educating the broader university community about these issues and stimulating debate. The impact
could be magnified if these sessions were able to reach the broader public as well, either by inviting the
community to come to campus, or by taking these programs to other sites within the community. These sessions
would need to be tightly focused sessions designed to teach people about a specific media law subject (the
elements of libel, the basics of fair use, for example) or to provide an informational overview of a more
complicated subject (net neutrality, for example) as way of empowering people to weigh in on the broader
public policy debate.
There is considerable scholarly research showing positive educational benefits from peer teaching and peer
learning,152 so these activities could simultaneously expand public knowledge and foster student learning.
Students could easily take these educational sessions to public high schools or community centers or find other
ways for them to have more of a service-learning dimension as well.

Summer Institutes and Certificate Programs
Universities around the country are looking for ways to use summer to accelerate students’ degree progress and
generate more revenue by attracting students from other universities or the community and taking advantage
of otherwise unused resources. A multi-credit summer institute focused on media law and policy, perhaps
combined with media ethics, could give students a chance to acquire special expertise in these subjects and
could introduce non-communication students and others unaffiliated with the university, particularly citizen
journalists or others with communication-focused careers and interests (public policy, government, non-profits),
providing an opportunity to develop some specialized knowledge while also earning a university certificate or
similar credential.

Conclusion
The most immediate aim of this article was to suggest that in this new era, when virtually every American citizen
is a mass communicator, there is a pressing need to expand citizens’ knowledge of media law, policy and the
First Amendment, and that universities can play an important role in meeting that challenge. Enhancing citizens’
knowledge of these subjects enlarges their expressive agency by helping them to avoid legal risks and to defend
themselves against direct and indirect suppression. It also apprises them of tools and resources they can use to
enhance the quality and impact of their speech and, potentially, to play a role in holding those in power
accountable.
At the same time, public opinion about the First Amendment and free expression is especially fluid right now.
People are intensely divided about the breadth of expressive freedom and about some of the assumptions
underlying much of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Technological changes are also forcing
us to reconsider conventional answers to elemental questions like what is speech, and who is a speaker.
Universities need to do their part to help ensure that these debates about the meaning of the First Amendment
are as informed as possible and that they are attentive to history but not chained to it.

Expanding citizens’ base of knowledge on these media-related subjects will also be important in the broader
political sphere. Many of the most powerful companies in the world are media companies,153 and many of the
world’s richest individuals made their fortunes in the media sector.154 And some of the most urgent policy
questions of this era, which will substantially determine the balance of social power in the next century, involve
the media in one way or another: government and corporate surveillance, net neutrality, hacking, big data, the
Internet, artificial intelligence, algorithmic communication. The country needs as many knowledgeable citizens
as possible to make their voices heard on these issues.
For democracy to work, there has to be an equilibrium between the practical power of citizens, on the one
hand, and government and business on the other. They will never be equal in every respect, but we should
worry when there are gross imbalances, as there are now.155 We should also worry when citizens, in the face of
these inequities, start to disengage politically. With that in mind, the proposals at the end of this article focused
not just on the inculcation of knowledge but on finding ways for students to apply that knowledge to affect
political and social change and to give them opportunities to envision themselves as the thought leaders and
change agents of the next generation.
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